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Abstract
In February of 2009 and 2010, President Obama made what some in the media 
and gaming industries construed as negative public statements regarding trips to Las 
Vegas. Some claimed these statements could easily be interpreted as a suggestion that 
companies and individuals avoid casino areas, thus doing additional harm to their 
surrounding economies during already tough times. In this paper, we use event study 
methodology to examine stock market reactions of U.S. casino-related businesses to 
the president’s statements. We find that President Obama’s statements were followed by 
significant negative abnormal returns in the segment of companies targeted more towards 
conventions, trade shows, and tourism, and by significant positive abnormal returns for 
companies with more of a local/regional focus. Our findings suggest that the president’s 
statements did not adversely affect all casino-related businesses, but they also were not 
benign. 
Keywords: bully pulpit, casinos, cumulative abnormal returns, event studies, gaming, 
Las Vegas, presidential rhetoric, stock market
Introduction
At a town hall meeting in Elkhart, Indiana, on February 9, 2009, U.S. President 
Barack Obama commented on companies that received federal “bailout” funds during 
the financial crisis, “You are not going to be able to give out these big bonuses until 
you’ve paid taxpayers back, you can’t get corporate jets, you can’t go take a trip to Las 
Vegas or go down to the Super Bowl on the taxpayer’s dime” (Mayor Goodman Writes, 
2009, 9). Businesspeople and individuals associated with the city were concerned that 
the general public would infer a different message from President Obama’s comments 
and the subsequent news reports. The mayor of Las Vegas, Oscar Goodman, summed up 
this concern in an interview with Fox News stating, “…with a rather reckless, cavalier 
remark on the part of the president, which will not be discerned by the average person in 
the public to apply to those folks who are receiving money, but as a general proposition, 
the message was, don’t come to Las Vegas” (CAVUTO, 2009, 12).
Within days following the president’s comment, several companies had already 
cancelled planned events in Las Vegas, including a three-day Goldman Sachs technology 
conference and a State Farm agents’ convention estimated at 17,000 attendees (Friess, 
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2009). Goldman Sachs relocated its conference to San Francisco despite incurring a 
$600,000 cancellation fee (Friess, 2009). It seemed as though corporate trips to casino 
destination cities would raise eyebrows, a fact that convention and tourism officials in 
other cities across the U.S. would use to try to steal customers. Mayor Goodman argued, 
“People are telling me that they’re not coming to Las Vegas because the president 
doesn’t want them to…There’s an impression out there that somehow if you come to Las 
Vegas, it’s going to reflect on your business culture, and that’s a bunch of hooey” (Friess, 
2009, 11).
On February 2, 2010, President Obama made a similar statement to that of a year 
prior, but this time the focus was on households rather than corporations. Speaking at 
a town hall meeting in Nashua, New Hampshire, the president said, “When times are 
tough, you tighten your belts…You don’t go buying a boat when you can barely pay 
your mortgage. You don’t blow a bunch of cash on Vegas when you’re trying to save 
for college” (President Obama Again, 2010, 2). Mayor Goodman again voiced his 
frustration, calling the President a “real slow learner” and stating that when he comes to 
town, “I’ll do everything I can to give him the boot” (Ayres, 2010, 2 & 10).
Theodore Roosevelt is credited with first use of the term “bully pulpit” to describe 
the extraordinary influence attributed to the rhetoric of the President of the United 
States. President Obama has himself recognized this influence and acknowledged the 
ability of his spoken words to impact the behavior of his constituents, stating, “When 
you’re president, you’ve got the bully pulpit” (In Obama’s Words, 2010, 21). This was 
preceded a few months earlier by Press Secretary Robert Gibbs stating, “I think that the 
bully pulpit can be a powerful thing” (Clifford, 2009, 18). In this paper, we examine this 
hypothesis in the context of President Obama’s two statements regarding corporate and 
individual behavior towards patronizing Las Vegas.
Convention and tourism business was already slumping in Las Vegas by 2009. 
But did the president’s words carry sufficient weight to further affect individual and 
corporate behavior? In a perfect world, a researcher would conduct an economic analysis 
by comparing factors like employment, wages, output, prices, and investment after 
the president made his statements to the same factors in an otherwise identical setting 
in which the president did not make his statements. Unfortunately, this procedure 
is impossible. As a proxy, one could examine these factors before and after each of 
President Obama’s statements and attempt to compare them to other areas unaffected by 
said statements. This is an extremely difficult exercise for a variety of reasons, some of 
which include the difficulty of completely and accurately gathering the necessary data, 
the difficulty of finding suitable control groups, the time lag associated with changes in 
employment, wages, prices, and investment due to the statements, and the wide range of 
confounding factors that could occur during this lag.
We use an alternative proxy technique which analyzes the U.S. stock market reaction 
to President Obama’s statements using event study methodology. This type of analysis 
measures the relationship of an event to the market value of affected businesses. Value is 
determined by investors who tend to be well-educated in the relevant markets, especially 
institutional investors, and have a strong financial incentive to act truthfully on their 
beliefs. The reliability of investor perceptions of value when estimating the incremental 
effect of a single event on a company is quite different from the reliability of their 
perceptions over time when Keynesian “animal spirits” and other types of irrational 
exuberance can set in and cause asset bubbles.
The specific research questions we address are:
Question 1 What is the price response (stock return) associated with President 
Obama’s statements for U.S. casino-related stocks?
Question 2 How, if at all, does this response differ across casino-related stock 
segments?
Whether intentional or not, President Obama’s comments were targeted at Las Vegas. 
However, his comments could also be interpreted more generally towards other U.S. 
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gaming destinations or any local casino. Thus, the economic impact is not necessarily 
confined to Las Vegas alone. If there is an impact, casino gaming properties and resorts 
would be directly affected while other businesses would be affected in an indirect manner. 
Therefore, we examine casino-related stocks with U.S. brick-and-mortar operations in 
this paper.
Our findings suggest that President Obama’s statements were not benign, but in 
a manner different than what one may naturally expect. At face value, both of the 
president’s statements tended to encourage a targeted reduction in demand towards casino 
properties, which should result in negative stock reactions. However, we find a negative 
stock reaction only for a distinct segment of casino companies, and we observe a positive 
stock reaction for a separate segment.
We wish to emphasize that the issue of causality can be a tricky one. In empirical 
research, it is a statistical assumption (the unconfoundedness assumption). We do not 
make that assumption and are not familiar with event studies that explicitly do so, 
although results are often discussed with a somewhat causal feel because of the statistical 
design. Readers, however, should refrain from using this type of causal language when 
interpreting these results. In that spirit, we avoid direct causal statements, and we also 
incorporate a discussion specifically addressing the issue of causality as it relates to event 
studies. 
Literature Review
Event Studies
Event study research was developed in the late 1960s. It is based on a foundation of 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which was formalized by Fama (1970) and is 
considered a cornerstone of modern finance theory. In its semi-strong form, the EMH 
states that the market will process all information as soon as it is publicly available and 
will adjust prices immediately to be in line with the value-relevancy of the information. 
Considerable research has been done in finance and accounting, providing robust 
evidence of semi-strong form market efficiency (Fama, 1970; Fama, Fisher, Jenson, 
& Roll, 1969; Malkiel, 2005). In theory, price responses should be 
immediate and complete. However, some research has shown that while 
an initial response is immediate, the complete response may take a 
few trading days (Atiase, Li, Supattarakul, & Tse, 2005; Beaver, 1968; 
Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980; May, 1971).
Researchers have taken the idea of the EMH and used it as a basis 
for determining the economic impact of disseminated information. In 
seminal studies, Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968) assessed the 
impact of accounting information by examining the release of earnings 
announcements. This started a research track that has taken a wider view 
to include various types of value-relevant information such as dividends, 
stock splits, earnings forecasts, changes in accounting processes, and changes in the tax 
code.
More broadly, any event that has information which is economically-relevant to 
publicly-traded companies can be examined through the lens of event studies and the 
EMH. Event studies have been used to investigate a great number of topics including the 
impact of antitrust filings on companies’ competitors (Bittlingmayer & Hazlett, 2000), 
the effect of macroeconomic news on stock prices (McQueen & Roley, 1993), the impact 
of a corporate name change on companies with Internet-related dotcom names (Cooper, 
Dimitrov, & Rau, 2001), and the effect of the Three Mile Island nuclear accident on 
public utility companies (Hill & Schneeweis, 1983). 
Presidential Influence 
  Prior research provides evidence that the types of presidential administrations may 
have an influence on the stock market. Niederhoffer, Gibbs, and Bullock (1970), Riley 
and Luksetich (1980), and Siegel (1998) found that the stock market performs better in 
A number of studies have 
examined the content of State 
of the Union addresses and 
found that presidential emphasis 
on particular issues increases 
public concern for said issues 
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the days and weeks following the election of a Republican president as compared to a 
Democratic president. Stovall (1992) found that stock market returns are greater during 
entire Democratic administrations than Republican administrations. Johnson, Chittenden, 
and Jensen (1999) extended this analysis by showing that there is no difference on the 
returns of large-cap stocks, but there is a substantial difference on small-cap stocks, with 
significantly higher returns during Democratic administrations.
The notion of the bully pulpit, i.e., the influence of presidential rhetoric on public 
opinion and behavior, is not new. President Obama and his staff have spoken openly of it, 
but this support is only anecdotal. Scientific evidence examining the power of presidential 
rhetoric is somewhat mixed. A number of studies have examined the content of State of the 
Union addresses and found that presidential emphasis on particular issues increases public 
concern for said issues (Cohen, 1995; Hill, 1998; Lawrence, 2002). Young and Perkins 
(2005) showed that this influence has diminished in recent years due to the changing 
structure and penetration of cable television. However, Edwards (2003) found little effect 
of presidential speeches on public opinion.
Wood, Owens, and Durham (2005) found that presidential statements about the 
economy affect the public’s perception of economic news and consumer confidence, and 
that this may have a meaningful impact on macroeconomic performance variables. They 
concluded, “The president’s words are a powerful instrument of economic leadership 
that can affect consumer perceptions of current and future economic conditions” (Wood, 
Owens, & Durham, 2005). Might this also extend to perceptions of future business activity 
and firm value in a particular industry? This paper adds to the literature on the influence 
of presidential rhetoric by examining the impact of two well-publicized, gaming-related 
presidential statements on the value of companies in the casino resort industry.
Method
Study Design
Our analysis uses well-developed event study methodology from modern finance 
theory. From a research perspective, this structure has many useful features. It is 
easy to gather complete and accurate data, a control group is not needed (other than 
controlling for general market movements), stock market reactions occur very quickly 
as information is disseminated, and investors tend to be well-informed and have their 
money, or their jobs, on the line. Additionally, event studies that examine clearly-
distinguishable events with daily stock returns (as opposed to weekly or monthly returns) 
have been shown in prior research to be very powerful, straightforward, and trouble-free 
(Kothari & Warner, 2007).
Every trading day an individual stock has a return, defined as the percent change in 
the stock price, inclusive of any dividends. The impact of general market movements 
on a stock’s price can be characterized as its normal return. The abnormal return is 
the impact of company- or industry-specific occurrences on a stock’s price. To obtain 
abnormal returns, we first estimate the market model over a 101-day estimation period 
for each stock. In this model, 
,   t = –110, …, –10
where t represents the number of trading days before (negative number) or after 
(positive number) the event date of t = 0,  is the return for firm i on day t,  
is the return on an equally-weighted market portfolio on day t, and  and  are 
regression parameters estimated as  and  by OLS over days –110 to –10 in event 
time. The event date is February 9, 2009 for 2009 regressions and February 2, 2010 for 
2010 regressions. The market model has been shown in simulations to have superior 
performance relative to other event study models (Armitage, 1995; Brown & Warner, 
1985; Lee & Varela, 1997) and the equally-weighted market index has been shown to 
have superior performance relative to other market indices (Corrado, 2011).
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Abnormal returns (ARs) for firm i are calculated as
.   t = –110, …, 4
Since the complete price response to new information can potentially take several 
days, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are calculated over multiple trading days 
known as the event window. In this paper, we construct CARs using a primary event 
window and two alternate windows
, (Primary)
, (Alternate)
, (Alternate)
where  uses an asymmetric (around t = 0) 3-day event window,  uses an 
asymmetric 5-day event window, and  uses the 3-day window just prior to the 
event (the pre-event window). We use an asymmetric event window because there is no 
question as to the timing of President Obama’s statements which, by all accounts, were 
completely unanticipated, eliminating concern about pre-announcement information 
leaks.1 Three days is the most common window length for short-horizon event studies 
using daily returns (Bartholdy, Olson, & Peare, 2007) and, thus, is our primary window 
length. We use two alternate event windows to perform sensitivity analyses, the 5-day 
window and the pre-event window. The additional days in the 5-day window allow for a 
full trading week of media response.
The Sample
Stocks were selected from Hoover’s “Gambling Resorts & Casinos” industry 
classification, which defines inclusion as “Companies that own, operate, and/or manage 
casino gaming operations, casino/resort hotel facilities, riverboat casinos, and other 
gaming properties” (Hoovers, 2011) Selected companies had to be traded on the NYSE, 
AMEX, or NASDAQ stock exchanges during February of 2009 and 2010 and have U.S. 
brick-and-mortar gaming operations. Stocks that fit these criteria composed our initial 
list. For each company, we collected stock price information for days t = , …, 4 
using the CRSP daily data set. We also collected data for the equally-weighted market 
index for use in the market model. We then filtered the initial list by year, excluding 
stocks that had an earnings announcement, dividend announcement, stock split, or 
significant company-specific news event within five trading days of February 9, 2009 or 
February 2, 2010, respectively. This was done to exclude stocks with known noise that 
would confound the analysis. Our initial stock list and the filtered list for each year can 
be seen in Table 1. Notable companies for which data were not available are Foxwoods 
Casino Resort, Harrah’s Entertainment, Station Casinos, and Trump Entertainment 
Resorts.2
Different businesses cater to and target different types of customers. Although casino-
related companies contain a variety of types of properties, information on their target 
customers and competition is available in their annual 10K reports. We segmented each 
company in our filtered list into one of two categories: CTT companies focused more 
towards conventions, trade shows, and tourists and Non-CTT companies generally 
focused more towards local or regional customers. Segmentation was performed 
on the basis of statements in their 10K reports regarding their target customers and 
competition, as well as on information regarding their meeting facilities. With respect 
1  Symmetric windows are used to analyze events where a portion of the information was reasonably an-
ticipated. Examples include corporate earnings announcements, tax policy changes, and new government 
regulations. In these cases, there is often extensive discussion, debate, and/or speculation leading up to the 
event, which is likely to impact stock prices before the actual event occurs
2 Foxwoods is privately owned by the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation, Harrah’s was delisted and taken 
private in January 2008, Station was delisted and taken private in November 2007, and Trump filed Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy and received a delisting notice in February 2009.
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to 10K statements, we looked to see whether conventioneers, trade shows, and tourism 
were a focal point of the discussion of target customers and competition. With respect to 
meeting facilities, eight properties of CTT companies were ranked in Tradeshow Week’s 
top 101 hotel exhibit halls for 2008, and each company had at least one property on the 
list. Non-CTT companies did not have any properties on the list. We manually added a 
few properties to the list by nature of their affiliation to large exhibit halls, even though 
the exhibit halls of the properties themselves did not make the cut. These properties are 
still able to target the convention and corporate events customer segments because of 
these affiliations. Venetian and Palazzo, Las Vegas Sands properties, were added due to 
their affiliation with the Sands Expo Center. Encore, a Wynn Resorts property, was added 
due to its affiliation with Wynn Las Vegas. Atlantis Casino Resort, a Monarch Casino 
& Resort property, was added due to its affiliation with the Reno-Sparks Convention 
Center (the two are physically connected via an enclosed skybridge). The criteria were 
applied evenly and consistently to each property of CTT and Non-CTT companies. Our 
segmented stock list can be seen in Table 1. It is important to remember that companies 
assigned to the same segment are not necessarily comparable on every characteristic, 
only the select characteristics used to segment.
Results
Descriptive Statistics and Histograms
Descriptive statistics of ARs and CARs for all three event windows are shown in 
Table 2. None of the means is significantly different from zero. Separate histograms of 
ARs and CARs for all companies using the primary 3-day event window are shown in 
Figure 1. Both distributions are reasonably symmetric around zero, appearing to support 
a hypothesis that President Obama’s statements were benign. These basic results are 
relatively trivial and do not support a bully pulpit hypothesis.
Table 1
Initial, Filtered, and Segmented List of Stocks Used in Analyses
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Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of Abnormal Returns
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Table 2 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Abnormal Returns 
 
 Mean  S .D. N 
3-Day Event Window    
    
 Daily Abnormal Returns    
 2009 .0036 .0345 27 
 2010 -.0027 .0255 24 
 Both Years .0006 .0305 51 
    
 Cumulative Abnormal Returns    
 2009 .0108 .0530 9 
 2010 -.0082 .0232 8 
 Both Years .0019 .0416 17 
    
5-Day Event Window    
    
 Daily Abnormal Returns    
 2009 .0010 .0371 45 
 2010 .0022 .0238 40 
 Both Years .0016 .0314 85 
    
 Cumulative Abnormal Returns    
 2009 .0051 .0828 9 
 2010 .0111 .0363 8 
 Both Years .0079 .0634 17 
    
3-Day Pre-Event Window    
    
 Daily Abnormal Returns    
 2009 -.0089 .0458 27 
 2010 .0044 .0315 24 
 Both Years -.0026 .0399 51 
    
 Cumulative Abnormal Returns    
 2009 -.0266 .0676 9 
 2010 .0133 .0380 8 
 Both Years -.0078 .0578 17 
 
Note. None of the means is significantly different from zero for α = .01.
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In Figure 2, we plot separate histograms of ARs and CARs for CTT and Non-CTT 
companies. For the AR histograms, a majority of the mass is on the negative return 
side in the CTT category and on the positive return side in the Non-CTT category. This 
gives rise to the question, could President Obama’s statements have been beneficial to 
some casino-related companies while detrimental to others? The picture becomes clearer 
with the examination of cumulative abnormal returns. There is a stark difference in the 
distributions of CARs across segments. All CTT stocks have negative CARs, while 
all but one of the Non-CTT stocks have positive CARs. While daily abnormal returns 
are a bit noisier, the cumulative effect over three trading days is abundantly clear. This 
evidence is visually striking and quite interesting in its implications. However, it is not 
rigorous and runs the risk of leading to faulty inferences if, in fact, randomness was the 
true underlying cause.
 Daily Abnormal Returns 
 
 
 Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
 
Figure 1.  Frequency histograms of daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal 
returns.  Abnormal return bins are on the x-axis.  Returns are over a 3-day event window 
for all stocks for 2009 and 2010 combined. 
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Statistical Tests
 We test the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1  for CTT stocks and all event windows
Hypothesis 2  for Non-CTT stocks and all event windows
Hypothesis 3  for all stocks and all event windows.
When performing statistical analyses, the strength of the findings are enhanced if it 
can be shown that the researcher’s assumptions are not driving the results. Sensitivity 
analysis is useful in this regard. We conduct sensitivity analyses using four different 
types of tests, detailed below, on three different event windows and three different stock 
categories. All test results were qualitatively similar when using a value-weighted market 
index rather than an equally-weighted one.
Potential hazards. The nature of this endeavor leads to small sample sizes due to 
the relatively small number of U.S. publicly-traded, casino-related stocks. Applying the 
requisite filtering criteria makes sample sizes even smaller. Out of nine filtered stocks 
in 2009, three are in the CTT segment and six are in the Non-CTT segment. Out of 
eight filtered stocks in 2010, four are in the CTT segment and four are in the Non-CTT 
segment. If we combine both years together and define the event as the 2009 or 2010 
 
 Daily Abnormal Returns 
 
 CTT Stocks Non-CTT Stocks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
 CTT Stocks Non-CTT Stocks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Frequency histograms of daily abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal 
returns by type of stock.  Abnormal return bins are on the x-axis.  Returns are over a 3-
day event window for all stocks for 2009 and 2010 combined.  CTT is convention, trade 
show, and tourist companies. 
 
68 UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal ♦ Volume 15 Issue 2
public statement towards Las Vegas by President Obama, then out of 17 filtered stocks, 
seven are in the CTT segment and ten are in the Non-CTT segment. 
These small samples lead to two primary concerns when running 
statistical tests: the power of the test and the applicability of the 
asymptotic properties of the estimators. 
When performing statistical tests from event studies, there are 
generally three major concerns: misspecification, event-induced 
volatility, and event-time clustering. Misspecification occurs when 
the assumptions of a parametric model are incorrect. Event-induced 
volatility occurs when stock return variance increases or decreases as 
a result of the event taking place. Controlling for this in an efficient 
manner will lead to proper Type I and II error rates. Event-time clustering occurs when 
a single event on a specific date impacts multiple companies or multiple industries at the 
same time. Examples include the 2010 financial reform act, interest rate announcements 
by the Federal Reserve, and the September 11th terrorist attacks. Event-time clustering, 
including the presidential statements in the present study, can cause stock return cross-
correlation which can lead to erroneously high rejection rates of hypothesis tests if 
not properly controlled. Researchers have developed parametric and nonparametric 
estimators to effectively control for these potential hazards (Boehmer, Musumeci, 
& Poulsen, 1991; Corrado, 1989; Corrado & Zivney, 1992; Cowan, 1992; Cowan & 
Sergeant, 1996; Jaffe, 1974; Kolari & Pynnonen, 2010a; Kolari & Pynnonen, 2010b; 
Wilcoxon, 1945).
Parametric tests. We use adjusted versions of the BMP test and the portfolio test for 
parametric analysis. The BMP test statistic, developed by Boehmer et al. (1991), accounts 
for possible event-induced volatility in stock returns. Return volatility may increase 
(variance inflation) or decrease (variance deflation) due to an event. The BMP test, one 
of the most commonly used parametric tests for event studies, controls for either of these 
scenarios. It has also been shown to be efficient and have a high level of power (Kolari & 
Pynnonen, 2010a). The portfolio test was developed by Jaffe (1974). It is frequently used 
when returns are potentially cross-correlated (Kolari & Pynnonen, 2010a), such as in our 
current study with event-time clustering due to the common event date for each of the 
president’s statements.3
Each test is “adjusted” to control for both potential cross-correlation and event-induced 
volatility. In terms of their general construction, the BMP test assesses whether sums of 
standardized CARs are sufficiently far from zero and the Portfolio test performs a similar 
procedure, but on an equally-weighted portfolio of the stocks in the sample (see references 
for more detailed information). The results of these tests are shown in Table 3.4
Table 3
Parametric Test Statistics of Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Stock Type
3 The portfolio test cannot be performed on data for both years combined due to the manner in which it is 
  constructed.
4 The adjusted BMP test statistics are asymptotically standard normal. Small sample size is not a significant 
  concern because the test statistic is derived from a standardized sum of a small number of t-statistics with 
  99 degrees of freedom. Thus, each t-statistic is very close to standard normal. Therefore, a large sample 
  size of stocks is not critical to achieve Central Limit Theorem convergence from t-stat to z-stat. The ad
  justed portfolio test statistic is a t-statistic with 99 degrees of freedom.
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Table 3 
 
Parametric Test Statistics of Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Stock Type 
 
Adjusted BMP Test 2009 2010 Both Years 
3-Day Window    
 CTT -2.55** -3.19*** -5.00*** 
 Non-CTT 2.90*** 3.29*** 3.77*** 
 All .40 -.71 -.19 
    
5-Day Window    
 CTT -4.07*** -1.25 -2.38** 
 Non-CTT 1.97** 1.64 2.72*** 
 All .01 .56 .44 
    
3-Day Pre-Event Window    
 CTT -1.49 .91 .27 
 Non-CTT -.3  -.19 -.39 
 All -.83 .68 .00   
 
Adjusted Portfolio Test 2009 2010  
3-Day Window    
 CTT -2.63*** -3.13***  
 Non-CTT 2.48** 3.15***  
 All .39 -.65  
    
5-Day Window    
 CTT -4.03*** -1.23  
 Non-CTT 1.82* 1.44  
 All .13 .50  
    
3-Day Pre-Event Window    
 CTT -1.49 .85  
 Non-CTT -.34 -.22  
 All -.79 .59  
 
Note. All tests are two-tailed.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at α = .01, .05, and .10, 
respectively. 
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The results are noteworthy within each test and are consistent across the tests. There 
is a significantly negative return effect on CTT stocks and a significantly positive return 
effect on Non-CTT stocks for the 3-day and 5-day event windows. The lone exception 
is for the 5-day event window in 2010. In this case, the statistics are of the same sign as 
those of the 3-day window and are close to the significance threshold. This weakness 
likely results from the additional noise of adding two superfluous days to the event 
window. When we combine CTT and Non-CTT stocks and examine them all together, 
there is no significant effect. Finally, we test each sample using a control period where 
there was no event (the pre-event window). As expected, we obtain weak, insignificant 
results all around. The totality of these test results provides robust support for a negative 
impact of President Obama’s statements on CTT company returns and a positive impact 
“Don’t Blow a Bunch of Cash on Vegas:”
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respectively. 
 
70 UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal ♦ Volume 15 Issue 2
on Non-CTT company returns.
Nonparametric tests. Nonparametric tests have an added layer of specification 
flexibility, but this comes at the cost of a potential loss of efficiency. However, they are 
useful ways of checking results and examining the sensitivity of assumptions. We use 
the generalized sign test of Cowan (1992) and the generalized rank test of Kolari & 
Pynnonen (2010b). Both control for event-induced volatility and cross-correlation and 
have been shown to have a high level of power among common alternative estimators 
(Cowan, 1992; Kolari & Pynnonen, 2010b). The generalized sign test examines the 
proportion of positive CARs in the event window and tests whether it is significantly 
different from the proportion of positive abnormal returns observed during the estimation 
period. The generalized rank test ranks all abnormal returns from highest to lowest. It 
then tests whether the ranking of event window CARs is significantly higher or lower 
than the average abnormal return rank of the estimation period (i.e., 50%). The results of 
these tests are shown in Table 4.
Table 4
Non-Parametric Test Statistics of Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Stock Type for 2009 
and 2010 Combined
Given the construction of the nonparametric tests, small sample size is more of a 
concern. We do not have enough data to possibly obtain meaningful results from the 
nonparametric tests when examining each year separately. When we examine both years 
combined, we find similar statistical results to the parametric tests: significantly negative 
returns to CTT stocks and significantly positive returns to Non-CTT stocks using the 
primary 3-day window, results of the same magnitude but with mixed significance using 
the alternate 5-day window, insignificant results when examining all stocks together, 
and insignificant results for all categories when using the pre-event window. The 
Note. Results were qualitatively similar for a sign test using the actual binomial 
distribution instead of the standard normal approximation with the Central 
Limit Theorem.All tests are two-tailed. ***, **, and * indicate significance at α = 
.01, .05, and .10, respectively.
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Table 4 
 
Non-Parametric Test Statistics of Cumulative Abnormal Returns by Stock Type for 2009 and 2010 
Combined 
 
Generalized 
S ign Test 
Generalized 
Rank Test 
3-Day Window   
 CTT -2.10** -3.36*** 
 Non-CTT 2.37** 3.45*** 
 All .23 -.04 
   
5-Day Window   
 CTT -1.35 -2.36** 
 Non-CTT 1.74* 2.71*** 
 All .23 .28 
   
3-Day Pre-Event Window   
 CTT .17 .16 
 Non-CTT -.79 -.70 
 All -.74 .04 
 
Note. Results were qualitatively similar for a sign test using the actual binomial distribution 
instead of the standard normal approximation with the Central Limit Theorem.All tests are two-
tailed.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at α = .01, .05, and .10, respectively. 
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nonparametric tests reinforce the findings of the parametric tests under a less restrictive 
set of assumptions.
Economic significance. Statistical significance supports the notion that President 
Obama’s statements had a non-zero effect on different types of casino-related businesses. 
Economic significance examines if the non-zero effect is meaningful. We find that 
the statements of the president were associated with a 2-7% reduction in market 
capitalization for CTT companies and a 1-6% increase in market capitalization for Non-
CTT companies. 
Discussion and Conclusions
Our analysis supports the hypothesis that presidential rhetoric can 
have a real impact on public behavior towards a particular industry 
with President Obama’s statements adversely affecting CTT companies 
and positively affecting Non-CTT companies in our sample. While one 
cannot statistically prove that a particular theory is true, the evidence 
is consistent with a theory that the president’s statements discouraged 
a sizeable number of individuals and businesses from travel to CTT 
casino areas, but did not discourage individuals from gambling at and 
frequenting all casinos. In this case, his comments might have merely 
shifted the behavior to other locations and venues.
By definition, it is unlikely that conventions and corporate events 
would shift from CTT casinos to Non-CTT casinos, so the reduction in 
these events was likely shifted to other CTT locations without gaming 
(e.g., San Francisco) or eliminated altogether. So what is driving the positive effect on 
Non-CTT casino companies? Our results support the notion that while individuals may 
have taken fewer overall gambling trips or downsized/downgraded their gambling trips, 
they continued to frequent Non-CTT casinos and marginally shifted some gambling 
activities to such properties; e.g., downgrading trips from CTT properties to Non-CTT 
properties or substituting local/regional Non-CTT gambling for more expensive CTT 
trips. Ariely (2008) and Thaler and Sunstein (2008) discuss interesting economic research 
about how incentives, expectations, and verbal cues can affect individual behavior.
There are a few caveats to our analysis. First, a few notable companies were not 
included because their stock was not publicly-traded. This does not diminish the 
relevance or significance of our analysis of publicly-traded companies, but it does mean 
that external validity is not certain and care should be taken when forming out-of-sample 
conclusions. Second, some casino-related companies are composed of a variety of types 
of subsidiaries. The process of segmenting companies into CTT and Non-CTT segments 
is not simple and unambiguous. While it can be tempting to be guided by anecdotal 
evidence or opinion, we instead employed dispassionate criteria in an attempt to segment 
different types of casino-related companies on the basis of specific characteristics. 
Finally, we do not perform an analysis of underlying economic data such as output 
and employment. This type of analysis is extremely difficult to credibly perform and is 
fraught with complications. Instead, we examine how the stock prices of casino-related 
companies behaved before and immediately after President Obama’s statements, using 
the directional change in market value as a proxy for economic impact.
Did President Obama’s statements cause the change in investor perceptions of future 
business activity and therefore the change in market value?  Rigorous event studies 
attempt to address questions of this type through a classic pre-test/post-test design. The 
market model is calibrated to the period before the event in order to analyze the period 
after the event, while the market portfolio serves as a quasi-control group. Firm- and 
industry-specific confounding factors are controlled for by excluded firms with known 
earnings announcements, stock split announcements, dividend announcements, or 
The evidence is consistent with 
a theory that the president’s 
statements discouraged a 
sizeable number of individuals 
and businesses from travel to 
CTT casino areas, but did not 
discourage individuals from 
gambling at and frequenting all 
casinos. 
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significant news events.5 Our specific study adds another layer of reliability by finding 
insignificant results in the pre-event window (i.e., the pre-test period). This type of 
design does not and cannot prove causality as causality itself is an assumption (Holland, 
1986).6
Our model shows that after imposing proper controls, CTT and Non-CTT company 
stock prices behave differently after the president’s statements than they did before, 
relative to the market, and the direction of this difference is consistent with the 
statements having a negative impact on CTT companies and a positive impact on Non-
CTT companies.  As with any empirical study, we reject the null hypothesis (no effect) 
within standard statistical boundaries and can only state that the observed results are 
consistent with certain hypotheses.  Could there be some omitted variable that is the 
hidden, underlying cause of the changes? This question could be asked of any empirical 
study and reasonableness should be the guide, not absolute proof.
When examining all casino-related companies in our dataset, results initially support 
the benign nature of the president’s statements about Las Vegas. But, 
after recognizing that different types of companies may be affected 
in different ways, we find strong results when analyzing CTT and 
Non-CTT casino segments separately. Results are the strongest with 
the primary 3-day window and are slightly weaker with the alternate 
5-day event window, which contains additional noise. During the 
pre-event control period, we would expect statistically insignificant 
results for both casino segments as well as for all companies 
combined. As expected, all results are weak during this period. 
Furthermore, the results do not appear to be driven by or sensitive 
to the assumptions of any particular statistical test, providing additional reliability and 
robustness support.
President Obama’s statements were not negatively associated with all publicly-traded, 
casino-related companies, nor were they negatively associated with all Las Vegas casino 
companies. They corresponded to statistically and economically significant negative 
return estimates for CTT casino companies (2-7% reduction in market capitalization) and 
statistically and economically significant positive return estimates for Non-CTT casino 
companies across the U.S. (1-6% increase in market capitalization). Our findings suggest 
that presidential rhetoric can be tailored towards particular industries in a positive or 
negative manner, and, whether intentional or not, may have been recently employed in a 
non-benign way with President Obama’s two statements about Las Vegas.
5  Las Vegas Sands announced earnings below analyst expectations after market close on February 11, 2009, 
and was excluded from the analysis. They experienced a significantly negative return shock the following 
day. MGM, Wynn, and Monarch did not experience a similar return shock and, in fact, experienced two 
positive return shocks and one benign. Thus, they do not appear to be contaminated by the Las Vegas Sands 
announcement in a manner that would bias towards a negative effect of the president’s 2009 statement on 
CTT companies.
President Obama’s statements 
were not negatively associated 
with all publicly-traded, casino-
related companies, nor were they 
negatively associated with all 
Las Vegas casino companies.  
73UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal ♦ Volume 15 Issue 2
“Don’t Blow a Bunch of Cash on Vegas:”
References
Ariely, D. (2008). Predictably irrational. New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers.
Armitage, S. (1995). Event study methods and evidence on their performance. Journal of 
Economic Surveys, 8, 25–52.
Atiase, R., Li, H., Supattarakul, S., & Tse, S. (2005). Market reaction to multiple 
contemporaneous earnings signals: Earnings announcements and future earnings 
guidance. Review of Accounting Studies, 10, 497-525.
Ayres, C. (2010, February 20). Mayor ‘bans’ Barack Obama from Las Vegas for sins 
against the city. The Times. Retrieved from http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/
world/us_and_americas/article7034492.ece
Ball, R., & Brown, P. (1968). An empirical evaluation of accounting income numbers. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 6, 159-178.
Bartholdy, J., Olson, D., & Peare, P. (2007). Conducting event studies on a small stock 
exchange. The European Journal of Finance, 13, 227-252.
Beaver, W. (1968). The information content of annual earnings announcements. Journal 
of Accounting Research, 6, 67-92.
Bittlingmayer, G., & Hazlett, T. (2000). DOS Kapital: Has antitrust action against 
Microsoft created value in the computer industry? Journal of Financial Economics, 55, 
329-359.
Boehmer, E., Musumeci, J., & Poulsen, A. (1991). Event study methodology under 
conditions of event induced variance. Journal of Financial Economics, 30, 253–72.
Brown, S., & Warner, J. (1985). Using daily stock returns: The case of event studies. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 14, 3–31.
CAVUTO for February 11, 2009 [Transcript, Television series episode]. (2009, 
February 11). In CAVUTO. Fox News Network, Inc. Retrieved from http://findarticles.
com/p/news-articles/analyst-wire/mi_8077/is_20090211/cavuto-february-11-2009/
ai_n50841176/
Clifford, C. (2009, December 14). Bank of America pledges $5 billion for small business 
loans. CNN Money. Retrieved from http://money.cnn.com/2009/12/14/smallbusiness/
bank_of_america_small_business_loans
Cohen, J. (1995). Presidential rhetoric and the public agenda. American Journal of 
Political Science, 39, 87-107.
Cooper, M., Dimitrov, O., & Rau, P. (2001). A rose.com by any other name. Journal of 
Finance, 56, 2371-2388.
Corrado, C. (1989). A nonparametric test for abnormal security-price performance in 
event studies. Journal of Financial Economics, 23, 385–95.
Corrado, C. (2011). Event studies: a methodology review. Accounting and Finance, 51, 
207–234.
Corrado, C., & Zivney, T. (1992). The specification and power of the sign test in event 
study hypothesis tests using daily stock returns. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 27, 465–78.
Cowan, A. (1992). Nonparametric event study tests. Review of Quantitative Finance and 
Accounting, 2, 343–58.
Cowan, A., & Sergeant, A. (1996). Trading frequency and event study test specification. 
Journal of Banking & Finance, 20, 1731–1757.
Edwards, G. (2003). On deaf ears: The limits of the bully pulpit. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press.
74 UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal ♦ Volume 15 Issue 2
Fama, E. (1970). Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work. 
Journal of Finance, 25, 383-417.
Fama, E., Fisher, L., Jenson, M., & Roll, R. (1969). The adjustment of stock prices to new 
information. International Economic Review, 10, 1-21.
Friess, S. (2009, February 14). Las Vegas sags as conventions cancel. New York Times. 
Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/15/us/15vegas.html
Grossman, S., & Stiglitz, J. (1980). On the impossibility of informationally efficient 
markets. The American Economic Review, 70, 393-408.
Hill, J., & Schneeweis, T. (1983). The effect of Three Mile Island on electric utility stock 
prices: A note. Journal of Finance, 38, 1285-1292.
Hill, K. (1998). The policy agendas of the president and the mass public: A research 
validation and extension. American Journal of Political Science, 42, 1328-34.
Holland, P. (1986). Statistics and causal inference. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 81, 945-960.
Hoover’s, Inc. (2011). Gambling resorts & casinos. Retrieved from http://www.hoovers.
com/industry/gambling-resorts-casinos/1432-1.html
In Obama’s words: Obama delivers remarks at a DCCC finance event. (2010, August 
16).The Washington Post. Retrieved from http://projects.washingtonpost.com/obama-
speeches/speech/368/
Jaffe, J. (1974). The effect of regulation changes on insider trading. Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science, 5, 93–121.
Johnson, R., Chittenden, W., & Jensen, G. (1999). Presidential politics, stocks, bonds, 
bills, and inflation. The Journal of Portfolio Management, 26, 27-31.
Kolari, J., & Pynnonen, S. (2010a). Event study testing with cross-sectional correlation of 
abnormal returns. Review of Financial Studies, 23, 3996-4025.
Kolari, J., & Pynnonen, S. (2010b). Nonparametric rank tests for event studies. Paper 
presented at the 21st Australasian Finance and Banking Conference 2008, Sydney, 
Australia. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=1254022
Kothari, S., & Warner, J. (2007). Econometrics of event studies. In B.E. Eckbo (Ed.), 
Handbooks of corporate finance: Empirical corporate finance (Ch. 1). Amsterdam: 
Elsevier/North-Holland.
Lawrence, A. (2002, August 28). Does it really matter what presidents say? The influence 
of presidential rhetoric on the public agenda, 1946-2002. Paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, Massachusetts. Retrieved 
from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p65825_index.html
Lee, S., & Varela, O. (1997). An investigation of event study methodologies with clustered 
events and event day uncertainty. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 8, 
211–228.
Malkiel, B. (2005). Reflections on the efficient market hypothesis: 30 years later. The 
Financial Review, 40, 1-9.
May, R. (1971). The influence of quarterly earnings announcements on investor decisions 
as reflected in common stock price changes. The Journal of Accounting Research, 9, 119-
163.
75UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal ♦ Volume 15 Issue 2
Mayor Goodman writes letter to Obama after Las Vegas remark [Television series 
episode]. (2009, February 11). In Channel 13 Action News. Las Vegas, Nevada: KTNV. 
Retrieved from http://www.ktnv.com/story/9827680/mayor-goodman-writes-letter-to-
obama-after-las-vegas-remark
McQueen, G., & Roley, V. (1993). Stock prices, news, and business conditions. The 
Review of Financial Studies, 6, 683-707.
Niederhoffer, V., Gibbs, S., & Bullock, J. (1970). Presidential elections and the stock 
market. Financial Analysts Journal, 26, 111-113.
President Obama again criticizes trips to Las Vegas [Television series episode]. (2010, 
February 2). In 8 News Now. Las Vegas, Nevada: KLAS-TV 8. Retrieved from http://
www.8newsnow.com/story/11922024/president-obama-again-criticizes-trips-to-las-vegas
Riley, W., & Luksetich, W. (1980). The market prefers Republicans: Myth or reality? 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 15, 541-559.
Siegel, J. (1998). Stocks for the long run. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Stovall, R. (1992). Forecasting stock market performance via the presidential cycle. 
Financial Analysts Journal, 48, 5-8.
Thaler, R., & Sunstein, C. (2008). Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth, and 
happiness. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Wood, D., Owens, C., & Durham, B. (2005). Presidential rhetoric and the economy. The 
Journal of Politics, 67, 627-645.
Wilcoxon, F. (1945). Individual comparisons by ranking methods. Biometrics, 1, 80–83.
Young, G., & Perkins, W. (2005). Presidential rhetoric, the public agenda, and the end of 
presidential television’s “Golden Age.” The Journal of Politics, 67, 1190-1205.
“Don’t Blow a Bunch of Cash on Vegas:”
76 UNLV Gaming Research & Review Journal ♦ Volume 15 Issue 2
 
